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In the last couple years, new editions of the two most prominent election law casebooks have been released,
and one entirely new casebook has been published. This is an opportune moment, then, both to review the
volumes and to assess the state of the field. Fortunately, both are strong. All of the casebooks are well-
organized, thorough in their coverage, and full of insightful commentary. And the field, at least as presented
by the volumes, is impressively confident in its substantive and methodological choices. There is a high
level of consensus as to both the subject areas that election law should include and the analytical methods
that it should employ.
Instructors looking to select a casebook thus are faced with an embarrassment of riches. Because all of
the volumes are excellent, my suggestion is that instructors make their choice based on their own substan-
tive and methodological inclinations. Those who are most interested in representational issues and in doc-
trinal context should select Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes. Those whowish to emphasize campaign finance
and empirical political science should choose Lowenstein, Hasen, and Tokaji. And those who want to focus
on democratic theory, history, and an unusually wide array of sources should pick Gardner and Charles.
There is no going wrong here.
INTRODUCTION
My first exposure to election law came ina seminar, ‘‘The Law of Democracy,’’ that
I took as a second-year law student.1 Owen Fiss
was my professor, and he assigned us the casebook
edited by Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and
Richard Pildes (‘‘Isskardes’’), then in its second edi-
tion.2 What I failed to realize at the time was how
distinctive a version of election law I was learning.
Fiss, who had not taught the class before, tried to
fitelectionlawdoctrinesintothebroaderconstitutional
law theories that are his forte. Isskardes resisted this
merger but had pedagogical quirks of their own, most
notably their heavy focus on race and representation
and their deep interest in doctrinal context.
When I began teaching election law myself, I
chose to use the Isskardes casebook, by then in its
fourth edition,3 because it was the one with which
I was most familiar. I did supplement the casebook
with law review articles that I posted as optional
readings, as well as empirical political science find-
ings that I explained to my students. But in most
respects my class followed the Isskardes (and Fiss)
template. Race and representation was the single
largest unit on my syllabus, and I often found myself
delving into the complex relationship between elec-
tion law and constitutional law.
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos is an assistant professor of law at
University of Chicago Law School in Chicago, IL.
1This was in the spring of 2005, almost a decade ago.
2See The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the
Political Process (Samuel Issacharoff et al. eds., 2d ed.
2002). I refer to all editions of this casebook as ‘‘Isskardes,’’
in honor of its three distinguished editors.
3See The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the
Political Process (Samuel Issacharoff et al. eds., 4th ed.
2012). I first taught election law in the winter quarter of
2013, shortly after the fourth edition’s release.
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It was not until I examined two other elec-
tion law casebooks for this review—the fifth edi-
tion of Daniel Lowenstein, Richard Hasen, and
Daniel Tokaji (‘‘Lowhaji’’),4 and a new volume
by James Gardner and Guy-Uriel Charles (‘‘Gar-
dles’’)5—that I appreciated how many different
ways there are to guide students through this mate-
rial. For starters, neither Lowhaji nor Gardles
devote nearly as much space as Isskardes to race-
related issues. Instead, Lowhaji’s emphasis is on
campaign finance, while Gardles’s is on demo-
cratic theory and institutions. Lowhaji and Gardles
also are not as doctrinally oriented as Isskardes.
Lowhaji provide countless citations to law review
articles, while Gardles often look further afield to
work by theoretical and empirical political scien-
tists. Gardles offer the additional innovation of
bolded substantive headings after each excerpted
case, rather than the more conventional series of
numbered points.
There exist multiple visions, then, of how to
teach election law, not just one. In this review, I
describe and gently interrogate these visions. I
begin by explaining in more detail the substantive
focus of each casebook. How much attention each
election law issue should receive, of course, is a
largely unanswerable question. Instructors will have
to choose among the volumes based on their own sub-
jectmatter preferences.Next, I summarize the sources
on which each casebook principally relies in its com-
mentary sections.6 Again, there is no right answer to
whether Supreme Court decisions are best supple-
mented by lower court cases, historical accounts,
comparative analysis, democratic theory, or empiri-
cal findings. Instructors will have to pick in accor-
dance with their own sense of election law’s place
in the academy. Lastly, I offer a few thoughts on
what the casebooks tell us about the state of the
field. On the whole, I am encouraged by both the
agreement as to what topics belong in the course
and the recognition of election law’s fundamentally
interdisciplinary nature.
One final point should be stressed at the outset:
All three casebooks are fine works that do an admi-
rable job of presenting the decisions and scholarship
that make up election law.7 All three are well orga-
nized, clearly written, and impressive in their cover-
age of the relevant material. I am therefore in the
fortunate position of not having (and indeed being
unable) to rank the casebooks on the basis of qual-
ity. Instructors too will have the luxury of choosing
among them based on their own substantive and
methodological inclinations.
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF ELECTION LAW
What are the topics that comprise election law?
And how should they be prioritized? These are
probably the most important questions faced by
casebook editors, but there is no consensus as to
their answers. In a provocative recent essay, for
example, Chad Flanders argues that the ‘‘core top-
ics of election law, topics that an introductory
class.simply must cover’’ are ‘‘participation,
representation, and political parties’’—but not
campaign finance, the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
or election administration.8 Conversely, Issachar-
off and Pildes assert that minority representa-
tion,which Flanders would omit from the election
law canon, is the ‘‘central issue in American
democracy.’’9 Likewise, Tokaji claims that ‘‘Elec-
tion Law teachers would.do well not only to
include election administration in the survey
course, but also to feature election administration
issues near the beginning of the term.’’10 And
Roy Schotland’s pithy summation of election
law, ‘‘ballots, bucks, maps and the law,’’ includes
one subject that Flanders would exclude entirely
4See Election Law: Cases and Materials (Daniel Hays
Lowenstein et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012). As with Isskardes, I
fuse the editors’ surnames into a single (perhaps ungainly)
noun.
5See Election Law in the American Political System
( James A. Gardner and Guy-Uriel Charles eds., 2012). Here
too I meld the editors’ surnames.
6By commentary sections I mean all of the casebook sections
that are not excerpts from major election law cases.
7I am sure the other two election law casebooks, Voting
Rights and Election Law (Michael Dimino et al. eds.,
2010), and Election Law and Litigation: The Judicial
Regulation of Politics (Edward B. Foley et al. eds.,
2014), are fine as well. The former has been in print for a bit
too long to address now, while the latter was not yet publicly
available when I wrote this review.
8Chad Flanders, Election Law: Too Big to Fail?, 56 St. Louis
U. L.J. 775, 778, 783–84 (2012).
9Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Not by ‘‘Election’’
Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1173, 1181 (1999).
10Daniel P. Tokaji, Teaching Election Administration, 56 St.
Louis U. L.J. 675, 675 (2012).
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(‘‘bucks’’) and two that he would cover only par-
tially (‘‘ballots’’ and ‘‘maps’’).11
In my view, it is not possible to assess the relative
significance of most election law topics. Areas such
as redistricting, campaign finance, minority repre-
sentation, and election administration are simply
too different from one another—and too important
in their own distinct ways—to be meaningfully
compared. Accordingly, I do not try here to evaluate
the substantive organization of each casebook rela-
tive to some platonic ideal of what an election law
course ought to contain. I do point out issues that
each casebook emphasizes or neglects, but my dis-
cussion is primarily descriptive.
Beginning with Isskardes, then, their casebook is
notable for both its heft—it checks in at 1262 pages,
almost 40% longer than Lowhaji or Gardles—and
its focus on race and representation. There are sep-
arate chapters on preclearance, vote dilution under
the Constitution, vote dilution under the VRA, and
racial gerrymandering, which run in sum to 350
pages, more than a quarter of the volume’s total
length.12 Some of the race-related cases that only
Isskardes excerpt are Whitcomb v. Chavis,13 John-
son v. De Grandy,14 Bartlett v. Strickland,15 and
LULAC v. Clements.16 Isskardes also include detailed
accounts of the 1982 amendments to the VRA17
and the operation of the three Gingles prongs.18
Their casebook clearly reflects their view that
minority representation is the ‘‘central issue in
American democracy.’’19
Beyond race-related issues, Isskardes dedicate
more space than Lowhaji or Gardles to redistrict-
ing, election administration, and alternative
electoral systems.20 The gap with respect to redis-
tricting is due mostly to Isskardes’s inclusion of
one-person, one-vote cases such as Colegrove v.
Green,21 Baker v. Carr,22 Gray v. Sanders,23 and
Karcher v. Daggett.24 The election administration
gap is attributable to the hundred or so pages that
Isskardes allocate to the saga of Bush v. Gore.25
And Isskardes’s chapter on alternative systems
such as cumulative voting, preferential voting, and
proportional representation has no analogue in
Lowhaji or Gardles.26
In contrast, Isskardes assign about the same num-
ber of pages as Lowhaji and Gardles to the regula-
tion of political parties. All three casebooks cover
a similar set of decisions spanning the White
Primaries, parties’ associational rights, and minor
party ballot access. Isskardes also commit substan-
tially less space than Lowhaji to campaign finance.
In a single sprawling chapter, they march briskly
and chronologically through cases from Buckley v.
Valeo27 to Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett.28 It is evident from this treat-
ment that campaign finance is not at the heart of
their conception of election law. As they wrote in
the preface to their casebook’s second edition, ‘‘we
sought merely to present enough material to enable
11Roy A. Schotland, And for the Student? The Seven Striking
Statements of ‘‘Ballots, Bucks, Maps and the Law,’’ 32 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1227, 1227 (1999); see also, e.g., Bruce E. Cain,
Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective,
32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (1999) (citing ‘‘general
areas of representation, campaign finance, corruption, and the
associational rights of political parties’’ as core of election
law); Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court:
An Introduction, 68Ohio St. L.J. 733, 734 (2007) (‘‘[E]lection
law is conceptually coherent as a field that unites the specific
areas of campaign finance, legislative redistricting, and voting
procedures as well as other specific areas, like ballot access
and the regulation of party primaries.’’); Michael J. Pitts, One
Person One Vote: Teaching ‘‘Sixth Grade Arithmetic’’, 56 St.
Louis U. L.J. 759, 759 (2012) (‘‘The opinions leading up to
and comprising the Redistricting Revolution of the 1960s rep-
resent the most fundamental element of the course in Election
Law.’’).
12See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 514–768, 840–934.
13403 U.S. 124 (1971).
14512 U.S. 997 (1994).
15556 U.S. 1 (2009).
16999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
17See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 623–51.
18See id. at 696–720.
19Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 9, at 1181; see also Cain,
supra note 11, at 1105 (observing that ‘‘the Issacharoff-Karlan-
Pildes collection concentrates more on voting rights and racial
gerrymandering’’); Paul Gronke, When and How to Teach Elec-
tion Law in the Undergraduate Classroom, 56 St. Louis U. L.J.
735, 737 (2012) (‘‘Issacharoff and colleagues focus much more
resolutely on.minority voting rights. ’’).
20Isskardes also devote more space to the right to vote, but this
is largely because their chapter on the franchise includes a sec-
tion on racial discrimination as well as cases such as Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), and Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), that the other casebooks
cover elsewhere.
21328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23372 U.S. 368 (1963).
24462 U.S. 725 (1983).
25531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); see Isskardes, supra note
3, at 1074–1177. However, Isskardes do not expend much space
on election administration issues such as voting technology,
voter registration, and vote fraud.
26See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 1178–1262.
27424 U.S. 1 (1976).
28131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); see Isskardes, supra note 3, at 332–
513.
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an introduction to the topic in a course we envisioned
as focusing more on other areas.’’29
If Isskardes are concerned above all with repre-
sentation (both racial and otherwise), then it is
money in politics that holds the greatest interest
for Lowhaji. Fully six of their fifteen chapters, total-
ing 322 of their 920 pages, address aspects of cam-
paign finance law.30 There is a chapter on bribery (a
topic ignored by Isskardes and Gardles), a chapter
on Buckley itself, and then a chapter on each major
form of campaign finance regulation: spending lim-
its, contribution limits, public financing, and disclo-
sure.31 Some of the decisions that only Lowhaji
excerpt are Speechnow.org v. FEC32 and Ognibene
v. Parkes33 (as well as all of the bribery-related
cases).34 They also include extended commentaries
on potential reforms35 and the empirical aspects of
money in politics.36
Given the attention they lavish on campaign
finance, Lowhaji do not explore any other topic in
equivalent depth. But even though their sections on
political parties and election administration are not
especially lengthy, they are quite thorough. Lowhaji
usefully divide their coverage of parties into a chap-
ter on major parties and a chapter on minor ones; and
they cover issues omitted by Isskardes and Gardles
such as the party in the legislature, presidential
nominations, and public financing for minor par-
ties.37 Similarly, Lowhaji’s use of voter participation
as a prism through which to examine the Help Amer-
ica Vote Act (HAVA), the National Voter Registration
Act (NVRA), and the VRA’s language assistance
provisions is innovative and nicely executed.38 This
section may reflect the influence of Tokaji, an expert
on election administration who became one of the
casebook’s editors in its previous edition.39
But while Lowhaji’s discussions of political
parties and election administration are concise yet
satisfying, their analyses of the right to vote and
minority representation are a bit too quick for my
taste. With respect to the franchise, the only Supreme
Court cases they excerpt are Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections40 and Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15.41 Landmark cases on
the exclusion of women,42 felons,43 and illiterates44
from the polls are absent, though they are included
by both Isskardes and Gardles. Likewise, vote dilu-
tion under the Constitution is mentioned only in pass-
ing by Lowhaji,45 while it occupies an entire chapter
in Isskardes. Lowhaji also excerpt just three VRA
Section 2 cases, Thornburg v. Gingles,46 Holder v.
Hall,47 and LULAC v. Perry,48 thus relegating key
decisions such as Johnson v. De Grandy49 and Bar-
tlett v. Strickland50 to the margins. I am sure that my
expectations in these areas have been shaped by
my own election law education, but I was still left
wanting more.
Finally, the hallmark of the Gardles casebook is
its emphasis on democratic theory and the institutions
of American democracy.While Isskardes and Lowhaji
begin with brief introductions featuring a few obliga-
tory references to Burke and the Federalist Papers,
Gardles start with two long prefatory chapters, one
on different theories of democracy, the other on
important aspects of the American political system.51
The theoretical chapter includes excerpts from Plato,
Locke, Mill, Downs, and Rousseau,52 while the
American chapter explores republicanism, the history
of racial discrimination, and the division of electoral
authority between the federal and state govern-
ments.53 None of this material is present in Isskardes
or Lowhaji, but it makes for an excellent introduction
to the course. It ‘‘embed[s] the field of election law in
29Id. at ix. They made this comment with respect to the case-
book’s first edition. The campaign finance chapter was
expanded substantially in the second edition (though it still
does not approach the thoroughness of Lowhaji on this topic).
30See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 599–920.
31See id.
32599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
33671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2012).
34See also Cain, supra note 11, at 1105 (observing that ‘‘Low-
enstein’s [casebook].is more focused on campaign finance’’).
35See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 874–81.
36See id. at 641–43, 676–80.
37See id. at 413–534. On the other hand, Lowhaji do not excerpt
important political primary cases such as California Demo-
cratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), or important ballot
access cases such as Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
38See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 323–40.
39See id. at xvii (noting Tokaji’s addition to the casebook).
40383 U.S. 663 (1966).
41395 U.S. 621 (1969).
42See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
43See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
44See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S.
45 (1959).
45See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 202–03.
46478 U.S. 30 (1986).
47512 U.S. 874 (1994).
48548 U.S. 399 (2006).
49512 U.S. 997 (1994).
50556 U.S. 1 (2009).
51See Gardles, supra note 5, at 1–92.
52See id. at 1–36.
53See id. at 37–92.
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a broader context that reveals its connection to.dem-
ocratic theory,’’ as Gardles put it in their preface.54
The Gardles casebook also stands out for the
attention it pays to a pair of doctrinal topics that
are covered more briskly by Isskardes and Lowhaji:
candidate qualifications and campaign speech. The
chapter on candidate qualifications covers term lim-
its, residency requirements, resign-to-run require-
ments, and the like.55 The chapter on campaign
speech goes through restrictions on its content and
manner, the fairness doctrine, and disclosure require-
ments.56 These are not issues at the heart of election
law as I (perhaps inaccurately) perceive the field, but
they may appeal to certain instructors.
Furthermore, even though they are not very
lengthy, Gardles’s sections on the right to vote and
political parties are quite effective. The chapter on
the franchise is organized by the type of restriction
at issue: gender, residency, literacy, age, wealth,
etc.57 This is a logical way to present a large number
of cases, and I would not be surprised if it caught on
with other casebook editors. Likewise, the chapter
on parties is subdivided into units on political the-
ory, ballot access, primary elections, and patronage.
This too struck me as a useful format for conveying
a sizeable amount of information.58
On the other hand, I was left unsatisfied by Gard-
les’s treatment of representational issues. In contrast
to Isskardes’s six chapters on these issues, Gardles
attempt to squeeze reapportionment, partisan gerry-
mandering, constitutional vote dilution, statutory
vote dilution, preclearance, and racial gerrymander-
ing into just two sections.59 Unsurprisingly, there
are some casualties along the way. For instance,
Reynolds v. Sims60 is the only legislative reappor-
tionment case that is excerpted, and Vieth v. Jube-
lirer,61 the most important partisan gerrymandering
case of the last generation, is noticeably absent.
Similarly, Thornburg v. Gingles62 is the only VRA

















FIG. 1. Subject matter page allocations in election law casebooks.
54See id. at xxiv.
55See id. at 397–448. Isskardes also cover term limits in their
chapter on direct democracy. See Isskardes, supra note 3, at
993–1020.
56See Gardles, supra note 5, at 561–636. Lowhaji also cover
certain campaign speech issues in their chapter on campaigns.
See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 535–98.
57See Gardles, supra note 5, at 93–146.
58See id. at 449–560.
59See id. at 147–396.
60377 U.S. 533 (1964). A case involving a special purpose dis-
trict and the one person, one vote rule, Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719
(1973), also is excerpted.
61541 U.S. 267 (2004). Vieth is mentioned briefly, see Gar-
dles, supra note 5, at 254–56, but not excerpted.
62478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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subsequent evolution of this provision is left to the
notes. In the campaign finance chapter as well—
which is otherwise very strong—none of the major
contribution limit cases, such as Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC63 and Randall v. Sor-
rell,64 are included.
Because the discussion to this point may seem like
a blur of cases and doctrines to some readers, I end
this Part with a chart that illustrates graphically
many of the above observations (see Figure 1). The
chart shows the number of pages devoted by each
casebook to seven major topics: race and representa-
tion, introductory/other, campaign finance, redis-
tricting, election administration, political parties,
and the right to vote.65 The much greater length
of Isskardes is immediately apparent, as is their
heavy focus on race and representation. Lowhaji’s
emphasis on campaign finance also is impossible
to miss, as is Gardles’s on issues that fit into the
introductory/other category. But perhaps the clear-
est takeaway is that it should not be difficult for
instructors to choose a casebook that mirrors their
own substantive preferences. In a nutshell, instruc-
tors should select Isskardes if they wish to highlight
representational issues, Lowhaji if they want to
stress campaign finance, and Gardles if their inter-
est is primarily in democratic theory.
II. THE METHODS OF ELECTION LAW
If the substance of election law is the most
important issue with which casebook editors must
wrestle, the field’s intellectual methods surely
come in a close second. But just as there is no con-
sensus as to content,66 so too is there marked dis-
agreement as to techniques. In earlier times, most
scholars believed that the doctrines of mainstream
constitutional law could be applied to election law
as well. As Heather Gerken has noted, ‘‘election
law [formerly] looked a bit like a faraway outpost
of constitutional law.’’67 Some observers still adhere
to this position; Flanders, for instance, has deemed
‘‘interdisciplinary work’’ a ‘‘temptation that we
might be better off resisting.’’68 Most contempo-
rary academics, however, have embraced the links
between election law and political science in partic-
ular.69 But here too there is tension between those
who depend heavily on empirical findings (and
even carry out their own empirical analyses),70
and those, like Gardner, who emphasize the ‘‘pitfalls
associated with reliance on political science.’’71 And
political science is not even the only field that is
entwined with election law. Still other scholars con-
sider history an ‘‘important interdisciplinary node,’’72
or argue that election law is ‘‘especially well-suited
to comparative study.’’73
As with the subjects that an election law case-
book has to prioritize, I do not believe it is feasible
to rank by relative value the methods that a case-
book should employ. Again, the various techniques
are too dissimilar from one another, and too signif-
icant in their own right, to be usefully compared.
I have my own methodological inclinations, of
63528 U.S. 377 (2000).
64548 U.S. 230 (2006).
65These topics are ordered by the number of pages devoted by
Isskardes to each of them. In addition, introductory/other
includes direct democracy, alternative electoral systems, candi-
date qualifications, and campaign speech; campaign finance
includes bribery; redistricting includes reapportionment and
partisan gerrymandering; and election administration includes
remedies.
66See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
67Heather K. Gerken, What Election Law Has to Say to Consti-
tutional Law, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 7, 7 (2010).
68Flanders, supra note 8, at 786; cf., e.g., Issacharoff and Pildes,
supra note 9, at 1183 (‘‘Ultimately our concern is with the struc-
tural aspects of constitutional law. ’’); Pamela S. Karlan, Con-
stitutional Law, the Political Process, and the Bondage of
Discipline, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (1999) (‘‘[O]ur
political institutions and practices cannot be understood in a
vacuum: they are a piece of constitutional law.’’).
69See, e.g., Cain, supra note 11, at 1119 (‘‘[T]his field consists
of elements of democratic theory, law, public policy, and empir-
ical political science.’’); Michael R. Dimino, The Natural and
the Familiar in Politics and Law, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 701,
707 (2012) (‘‘[T]here is no escaping the fact that political sci-
ence and political theory pervade the Election Law course. ’’);
Richard L. Hasen, Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and
Words of Caution, 32 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1095, 1095 (1999) (re-
ferring to political science as one of election law’s ‘‘parents’’).
70I count myself in this group, along with scholars such as Chris
Elmendorf, Michael Gilbert, Jim Greiner, Nate Persily, and
Doug Spencer.
71James A. Gardner, Stop Me Before I Quantify Again: The Role
of Political Science in the Study of Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A.
L.Rev. 1141, 1144 (1999); see also James A. Gardner, Election
Law as Applied Democratic Theory, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 689,
691 (2012) [hereinafter Gardner, Applied Theory] (claiming
that ‘‘[w]ith the exception of the very best work in the field,
political science tends to analyze every issue in terms of its par-
tisan consequences’’).
72Kirsen Nussbaumer, Election Law as Elective of Choice, 56
St. Louis U. L.J. 747, 752 (2012).
73Tokaji, supra note 10, at 686; see also Isskardes, supra note
3, at xiv; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Excep-
tionalism, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 769, 775 (2013) (‘‘This Article
proceeds in comparative fashion.because.there is much
that we can learn by looking beyond our borders.’’).
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course, but I try to bracket them in the discussion
that follows. My goal is simply to describe the cog-
nate fields on which each casebook focuses, so that
instructors can choose among the volumes based on
their own views of election law’s place in the aca-
demic universe.
Beginning with Isskardes, then, my assessment
is that, relative to Lowhaji and Gardles, they
include more comparative analysis and more scru-
tiny of legal doctrine—but less democratic theory
and less empirical political science. As noted ear-
lier, Isskardes dedicate an entire chapter to alterna-
tive electoral systems, thus demonstrating their
commitment to ‘‘provid[ing] a comprehensive
overview of alternatives to the traditional American
approach.’’74 Their case notes also brim with detailed
questions about the Justices’ reasoning, and descrip-
tions of notable lower court decisions, and accounts
of on-the-ground developments before and after
major cases. By comparison, the volume of refer-
ences to theoretical and empirical political science
scholarship seems lower to me. These references
are unquestionably present, but they are not as
abundant as in Lowhaji or Gardles.
Lowhaji, on the other hand, shower the reader
with citations to law review and political science
articles. It is not uncommon for them to provide
string cites of a dozen or more publications (often
with little, if any, discussion after each source).
They clearly keep their introductory promise to be
‘‘alert to empirical findings of social scientists.’’75
Their casebook also is notable for its tendency to
substitute excerpts from academic works for Supreme
Court decisions. Among the scholars whose pieces
are featured in the same fashion as landmark cases
are Richard Ellis on direct democracy,76 Morris
Fiorina on political parties,77 and Edward Foley
on campaign finance.78 However, Lowhaji offer
much less comparative analysis than Isskardes;
one learns little from their casebook about how
other countries address tricky election law issues.
There also is somewhat less in the way of traditional
doctrinal commentary (though it still accounts for a
substantial fraction of the case note content).
Finally, Gardles display some of the same char-
acteristics as Lowhaji, only to an even greater
extent. For example, in contrast to the half dozen
or so excerpts from academic works in Lowhaji,
there are several dozen such excerpts in Gardles.
In the first two chapters alone (covering democratic
theory and American democratic institutions), I
counted twenty-three selections from figures includ-
ing Plato, Judith Shklar, Walt Whitman, Taylor
Branch, and Alexander Keyssar.79 The unconven-
tional excerpts continue unabated in the more doc-
trinal sections that follow. The chapter on candidate
qualifications begins with Henry St. John Boling-
broke on the idea of a patriot king,80 the chapter on
election administration with a Senate subcommittee
hearing transcript,81 and so forth. Like Lowhaji, Gar-
dles also provide many citations to empirical political
science findings. But they make a different choice
with respect to the tradeoff between quantity and cov-
erage. They typically include fewer citations than
Lowhaji, but with more discussion of each finding.
Gardles stand out as well for their greater atten-
tiveness to history. Their chapters on candidate
qualifications, political parties, campaign speech,
and campaign finance all include useful accounts
of how the issues have been addressed in previous
eras.82 With respect to comparative analysis, fur-
thermore, Gardles occupy an intermediate position
between Isskardes and Lowhaji. They discuss for-
eign countries’ policies on reapportionment, minor-
ity representation, and campaign finance,83 but not
as thoroughly as Isskardes. Lastly, what is clearly
sacrificed by Gardles is the doctrinal commentary
that is the staple of most casebooks. They offer fewer
questions about Justices’ arguments than Isskardes
and Lowhaji, fewer articulations of legal rules, and
fewer references to lower court decisions. And there
is no doubt that this doctrinal deficit is deliberate.
As Gardles write in their introduction, they aim not
to ‘‘prepare students for the actual field of practice,’’
but rather to ‘‘focus on the most general (and, in
our view, the most interesting) aspects of the field.’’84
Because these appraisals of the casebooks’ meth-
ods are somewhat abstract, I conclude this Part by
examining more carefully how each volume treats
two specific topics: partisan gerrymandering and
74Isskardes, supra note 3, at xiv; see id. at 1178–1261.
75Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 3.
76See id. at 342–50.
77See id. at 417–27.
78See id. at 686–93; see alsoDimino, supra note 69, at 707 (not-
ing that Lowhaji casebook ‘‘features cases no more prominently
than it features essays on politics’’).
79See Gardles, supra note 5, at 1–92.
80See id. at 397–99.
81See id. at 831–34.
82See id. at 397–402, 449–54, 561–64, 637–52.
83See id. at 215–16, 353–54, 690.
84Id. at xxv.
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political parties.85 Beginning with gerrymandering
and Isskardes, their focus on doctrinal context is evi-
dent throughout their chapter on the issue. They
include excerpts from three Supreme Court decisions
(Gaffney v. Cummings,86 Karcher, and Vieth), they
relentlessly probe the Justices’ arguments,87 and
they describe lower court cases in California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
and North Carolina.88 There also is some discussion
of empirical political science findings,89 but it is brief
by comparison.
Lowhaji, on the other hand, provide about twenty
pages of legal and empirical analysis before excerpt-
ing their sole Supreme Court case (Vieth).90 This
analysis covers states’ redistricting criteria, metrics
of gerrymandering such as partisan bias and seat/
vote ratios, and potential institutional and proce-
dural reforms.91 After the Vieth excerpt and some
related observations, Lowhaji end their chapter with
a twenty-page section on competitiveness, which
also draws heavily from the political science litera-
ture.92 Gardles, lastly, greet the reader with a selec-
tion of highly theoretical material on the different
types of representation.93 They then excerpt Davis
v. Bandemer94 rather than Vieth, and follow this
passage with a mix of doctrinal and empirical com-
mentary. Among the empirical topics they tackle are
policy distortion, voter alienation, electoral respon-
siveness, and legislative polarization.95
The casebooks’ respective styles are equally
clear in their chapters on political parties. Isskardes
begin with a brief history of American parties,96 and
later offer a description of party regulation abroad97
as well as a Downsian account of why U.S. electoral
rules typically give rise to two major parties.98 But
the core of their discussion is again doctrinal and
contextual. They excerpt thirteen separate Court
decisions—covering the White Primaries, individu-
als’ participatory rights, parties’ associational rights,
and third party ballot access—and accompany these
passages with their familiar blend of questions
about the Justices’ reasoning and summaries of
lower court cases.99
In contrast, Lowhaji lead off their section with a
long discussion of party accountability featuring an
excerpt from political scientist Morris Fiorina.100
They then address the White Primary Cases not by
providing the decisions’ actual text but by showcas-
ing one of Lowenstein’s articles on the subject.101 In
sum, forty pages go by before the first Court case,
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,102 is
excerpted, and it is one of only five decisions to
receive such treatment. The commentary on these
cases is mostly doctrinal, though there is also a thor-
ough explanation of the obstacles faced by third par-
ties in the U.S. system.103
Finally, Gardles open their chapter with Wash-
ington’s famous warning about the ‘‘baneful effects
of the spirit of party,’’ and follow it with an extended
treatment of republicanism, the rise of the modern
party in the nineteenth century, and the responsible
party government debate of the mid-twentieth centu-
ry.104 Only at this point do the case excerpts begin—
but once they begin, they proceed in rapid-fire fash-
ion, numbering twelve in total.105 The excerpts are
supplemented by a substantial amount of doctrinal
analysis, though there are notes as well about two-
party versus multiparty systems106 and the coher-
ence of American parties.107
My conclusion, then, is that the casebooks differ in
their methodological orientations at least as much
as in their substantive priorities. Isskardes are rela-
tively (though far from exclusively) focused on doctri-
nal context. Gardles downplay doctrinal analysis in
favor of democratic theory, empirical political science,
and historical exposition. And Lowhaji are somewhere
85I choose these topics because all three casebooks devote
approximately the same space to them. There are 71 pages on
partisan gerrymandering in Isskardes, 65 in Lowhaji, and 54
in Gardles. Similarly, there are 118 pages on political parties
in Isskardes, 122 in Lowhaji, and 112 in Gardles.
86412 U.S. 735 (1973).
87See, e.g., Isskardes, supra note 3, at 777, 779–82, 819–22.
88See id. at 782–90, 822–27, 832–33.
89See id. at 785–86, 828–29.
90See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 100–21.
91See id.
92See id. at 144–63.
93See Gardles, supra note 5, at 147–52, 162–69; cf. Gardner,
Applied Theory, supra note 71, at 696 (‘‘Instead of simply div-
ing in[].I begin with a session contemplating the institution of
representation itself.’’).
94478 U.S. 109 (1986).
95See Gardles, supra note 5, at 260–71.
96See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 215–17.
97See id. at 275.
98See id. at 316–17.
99See id. at 221–331.
100See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 413–31.
101See id. at 431–41.
102479 U.S. 208 (1986).
103See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 495–500.
104See Gardles, supra note 5, at 449–62.
105See id. at 467–557.
106See id. at 492–97.
107See id. at 511–12.
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between these poles with respect to both doctrinal
and non-doctrinal techniques. Instructors with a wide
range of methodological preferences thus should be
able to pick a volume that suits their tastes.
III. THE STATE OF ELECTION LAW
The release of two updated casebook editions, and
one entirely new casebook, is an opportune moment
for assessing the state of election law.108 In my view,
the message conveyed by these volumes is quite
encouraging and exciting. Despite the differences
between the tomes, there is a good deal of agreement
as to both what topics should be included in the field
and what methods should be used to study them.
Election law also comes across as an exceptionally
dynamic area, much of whose content is still in doc-
trinal and empirical flux. But I worry that the case-
books do not fully capture the range of election law
scholarship. In particular, some of the field’s major
cleavages are not conveyed, and some of its poten-
tially unifying theories are not presented.
In Part I of this review, I stressed the ways in
which the casebooks diverge substantively: Isskard-
es’s emphasis on race and representation, Lowhaji’s
focus on campaign finance, Gardles’s interest in
democratic theory, and so on.109 But what was left
unsaid earlier is the volumes’ high degree of subject
matter convergence. All three sets of editors agree
that an election law course ought to cover race
and representation, campaign finance, redistricting,
election administration, political parties, and the
right to vote.110 The only topics that are included
in some casebooks but not in others are direct democ-
racy, alternative electoral systems, candidate quali-
fications, bribery, and campaign speech.111 These
issues are not at the core of most conceptions of
election law—none of them is included in Schotland’s
reference to ‘‘ballots, bucks, [and] maps’’112—and
together they account for only a small fraction of
the casebooks’ total length.113
What this means is that the substantive bound-
aries of election law are reasonably clear. There is
no great controversy over which topics lie within
its domain and which lie without.114 This is an aus-
picious position for the field to occupy—secure in
the subjects that it studies, and untroubled by anxi-
ety about its place in the broader public law world.
And if anything it probably will be easier to priori-
tize election law’s various subfields in the future.
Thanks to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Shelby County v. Holder,115 Section 5 of the VRA is
now effectively defunct. The next edition of Isskardes
therefore will be unlikely to devote as much space to
the VRA specifically, or to race and representation
generally. Likewise, thanks to a series of recent
cases,116 it is now obvious that no expenditure restric-
tion can pass muster with the current Court. It thus is
doubtful that the next edition of Lowhaji will attend
as carefully to spending limits specifically, or to cam-
paign finance generally. Doctrinal evolution may
induce convergence not only with respect to cover-
age, but also with respect to emphasis.
The methodological story resembles the substan-
tive one. As I explained in Part II, the casebooks do
differ in their preferred academic approaches, with
Isskardes being more doctrinally oriented, Gardles
paying the most heed to political science scholar-
ship, and Lowhaji falling someplace in between.117
But these differences pale in comparison to the vol-
umes’ methodological similarities. All three sets of
editors agree that election law cannot be taught
through doctrinal analysis alone. All three sets also
agree that the additional modes of inquiry that hold
the most promise are democratic theory, empirical
social science, historical study, and comparative
examination. Even Isskardes, the most doctrinally
inclined of the editors, frequently employ all of
these techniques.118 There is thus a consensus that
108The moment is even more opportune given the 2010 issuance
of one more casebook and the forthcoming publication of yet
another one. See supra note 7.
109See supra Part I.
110See id. These topics are ordered again by the number of
pages devoted to them by Isskardes. See supra note 65.
111See id.
112See Schotland, supra note 11, at 1227.
113Specifically, they take up 174 pages in Isskardes (out of
1262), 178 in Lowhaji (out of 921), and 128 in Gardles (out
of 910).
114See Cain, supra note 11, at 1105 (noting his ‘‘basic conclu-
sion that there is a core to this field, about which scholars
share common knowledge, if not common conclusions’’);
Foley, supra note 11, at 734 (‘‘[E]lection law is conceptually
coherent. ’’).
115133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
116Chief among these, of course, is Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
117See supra Part II.
118See, e.g., Isskardes, supra note 3, at 10, 316, 889, 936,
1179, 1239, 1247 (democratic theory); id. at 35, 79, 94, 123,
158, 176, 470, 498, 582, 676, 699, 785, 828, 845, 910, 1214
(empirical social science); id. at 22, 55, 103, 111, 206, 215,
333, 514, 625, 1243 (historical examination); id. at 22, 55,
103, 111, 206, 215, 333, 514, 625, 1243 (comparative study).
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‘‘[e]lection law is truly an interdisciplinary enter-
prise,’’ as political scientist (and Election Law Jour-
nal editor) Paul Gronke puts it.119
As the insights from cognate fields continue to
accumulate, all three casebooks may benefit by add-
ing as editors scholars who are not law professors.
When I perused the volumes for this review, I was
impressed by the range and quality of their non-legal
content. But even as a law professor myself—and
hence not an expert on non-legal issues—I still
noticed omissions in the casebooks’ coverage of
topics with which I am familiar. To give just one
example, a good deal of democratic theory argues
that voters’ policy preferences should be aligned
with those of their representatives,120 and a good
deal of empirical scholarship tries to assess the
effects of different electoral rules on preference
alignment.121 Yet almost none of this literature is
cited by the casebooks, even though it is some of
the most relevant and interesting work of contempo-
rary political science. I doubt that this material
would have been missed by a specialist in the area. I
also doubt that the interdisciplinary promise of elec-
tion law will be fulfilled until the interdisciplinarity
progresses from casebook content to casebook
editing.122
While the most important aspects of a legal field
may be its substance and its methods, they do not
exhaust the universe of noteworthy characteristics.
Three key additional facets are a field’s dynamism,
its level of judicial and scholarly agreement, and its
overall intellectual coherence. I close this Part, then,
by considering what the casebooks do (and poten-
tially could) tell us about these issues. To begin
with, it is evident from all three volumes that elec-
tion law is a subject that is still very much in flux.
In area after area, major excerpted cases were deci-
ded not decades or generations ago, but rather in the
last few years. Think of Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board123 in the right-to-vote context (de-
cided in 2008), Washington State Grange v. Wash-
ington State Republican Party124 in the political
party context (also 2008), LULAC and Shelby County
in the VRA context (2006 and 2013), and Citizens
United, Arizona Free Enterprise, and McCutcheon
v. FEC125 in the campaign finance context (2010,
2011, and 2014). This remarkable series of land-
mark decisions is part of what makes election law
such an exhilarating field. The pillars of the doc-
trine are shifting before our very eyes. The relation-
ship between law and politics remains protean.
Next, however, the casebooks do only a passable
job of revealing the intense disagreement among
judges and scholars as to many election law issues.
The degree of judicial discord is illustrated effec-
tively enough by the dueling excerpts from major-
ity and dissenting opinions. But the extent to which
scholars clash over democratic values, doctrinal
applications, and policy recommendations often is
not conveyed fully. For instance, perhaps the most
contentious debate in the redistricting domain is
whether there exists a manageable standard for iden-
tifying a partisan gerrymander (and, if so, what it
is). The casebooks all allude to this debate, but
none of them presents the assorted positions in
much detail.126 Similarly heated disputes over the
electoral effects of franchise restrictions,127 the
link between primary type and legislative polariza-
tion,128 and the underlying purpose of the VRA129
tend to be addressed in abbreviated fashion. A
119Gronke, supra note 19, at 736; see also, e.g., Gardner,
Applied Theory, supra note 71, at 689 (‘‘[E]lection law connects
to two fields with which it is so closely allied that, in my view, it
cannot be usefully separated from either of them: democratic
theory and empirical political science.’’); Nussbaumer, supra
note 72, at 748–52 (going through series of ‘‘interdisciplinary
nodes’’ connecting election law to other fields).
120See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment,
114 Colum. L. Rev. 283, 313–16, 320–23 (2014) (summariz-
ing this literature).
121See id. at 323–56 (summarizing this literature).
122Cf. Bruce E. Cain, Teaching Election Law to Political Scien-
tists, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 725, 727 (2012) (‘‘Political scientists
and legal scholars also draw on different literatures when they
look at election law problems. The former will know a lot
about the relevant empirical literature or theories of representa-
tion. ’’).
123553 U.S. 181 (2008).
124552 U.S. 442 (2008).
125134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
126See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 819–27 (mostly discussing
lower court cases in notes following excerpt from Vieth); Low-
haji, supra note 4, at 139–40 (citing without discussion array of
articles published after Vieth); Gardles, supra note 5, at 260–
67 (focusing on reasons why gerrymandering is perceived as
problematic).
127See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 95–96 (citing single study
on voter fraud prevalence); Gardles, supra note 5, at 834–
35 (citing pair of studies). But see Lowhaji, supra note 4, at
319–21 (discussing issue in greater detail).
128See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 274–80 (not addressing this
issue); Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 462–75 (same); Gardles,
supra note 5, at 543–49 (same).
129See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 750–68 (focusing on consti-
tutionality of Section 2 and Justice Thomas’s effort to narrow it
to vote denial claims); Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 224–28 (sum-
marizing scholarly views on Gingles in particular); Gardles,
supra note 5, at 336–41 (providing mostly doctrinal commen-
tary on Gingles).
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reader would realize that scholars disagree with
both the Court and one another, but she would not
grasp how riven the field actually is.
Finally, the casebooks are shakier still in their
coverage of theories that aim to unify the varied
subfields of election law. In recent years, scholars
have proposed several approaches for deciding cases
(and framing questions) across a wide range of
areas: Hasen’s political equality principles,130 Issa-
charoff and Pildes’s competition-centered structur-
alism,131 Justice Breyer’s participatory account,132
my own alignment approach,133 and so forth. None
of the casebooks’ introductory chapters discuss
these theories at any length, nor do any of the
volumes feature concluding sections seeking to
weave together the preceding material. In fact, the
only references I found to the theories are a passage
on how the White Primaries suppressed competition
in Isskardes,134 analyses of the effect of redistrict-
ing on competition in Isskardes135 and Lowhaji,136
a comment on how election administration influ-
ences participation in Lowhaji,137 and a note in
Gardles that preference alignment is one available
model of representation.138 These references do
not adequately educate a reader about the theo-
ries’ trans-substantive goals—their hopes of yoking
together an array of topics under a single banner.
The references do not adequately make the point
that election law is a coherent field of study, not
merely a collection of issues pertaining to the regu-
lation of elections.
Fortunately, neither this point, nor the previous
one about the field’s internal rifts, would be very
difficult to make. A short introductory or concluding
section on overarching election law principles would
suffice to show that there is a thematic unity to the
field. Similarly, for each major topic, a few more
of the case notes could be devoted to summarizing
the rival academic positions. Many of the relevant
sources already are cited in the casebooks—it is
just their presentation that would have to change.139
Through these minor revisions, a reader would gain
an understanding of the one subject not already cov-
ered in enough detail in the volumes: the contours of
the field’s scholarly landscape.
CONCLUSION
The only conclusion that one can draw from the
three new or updated casebooks is that the state of
election law is strong. The field has a clear sense
of its substantive identity. Methodologically too,
there is a striking consensus about the field’s inter-
disciplinary nature. And the steady supply of major
election law decisions means that the field is in no
danger of becoming dull. As for the minor nits I
have picked with the casebooks, all of them could
be addressed without much difficulty in future edi-
tions. With a political scientist editor or two, some
additional commentary about the field’s academic
cleavages, and some more discussion of its unifying
theories, all of my concerns would be satisfied.
Then the casebooks would fulfill their interdisci-
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130See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Elec-
tion Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v.
Gore (2003).
131See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics
as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 643 (1998).
132See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our
Democratic Constitution (2005).
133See Stephanopoulos, supra note 120.
134See Isskardes, supra note 3, at 237–38.
135See id. at 828–31.
136See Lowhaji, supra note 4, at 144–63. This analysis is
located in the chapter on partisan gerrymandering but discusses
other issues as well. Perhaps it could be moved to the beginning
or end of the casebook.
137See id. at 323–40. This commentary also addresses issues
beyond election administration, and so could be moved to a
more prominent location.
138See Gardles, supra note 5, at 151.
139An example of the kind of presentation I have in mind is
Lowhaji’s survey of scholarly views on Gingles. See Lowhaji,
supra note 4, at 224–28.
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